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Abstract 
 The aim of this study is to determine whether house prices in the UK react differently to 
negative and positive shocks using the asymmetric cointegration approach. The asymmetric 
adjustments from disequilibrium are likely to exist following different shocks due to the 
collective reactions of policymakers, homeowners, mortgage lenders and investors. Using the 
MTAR model we test whether prices move back to equilibrium more quickly after a fall than 
a rise, potentially as a result of intervention by the authorities who are more concerned by 
falls due to the potentially damaging affects this can have for the whole economy. The 
empirical results reveal the existence of an asymmetric long-run relationship between house 
prices and housing market fundamentals, where negative shocks to the housing market cause 
convergence between the variables and positive shocks result in divergence. The results also 
suggest this varies across housing types, although there is little evidence that housing follows 
a political housing cycle.  
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1. Introduction 
The house price bubble leading up to the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 was one of the 
largest ever and most damaging to the wider economy. Over the preceding 10 years, property 
transactions had grown by 38% and house prices had trebled, however in 2007 the market 
reached its peak with the initial fall in house prices contributing to the subsequent financial 
crisis. However the house price bubble never totally deflated, as house prices remained 
relatively stable after 2010, despite the UK economys worst peacetime decline in output 
(King, 2009). The aim of this study is to determine if there is any asymmetry in the speed of 
adjustment of house prices depending on whether they are above or below their equilibrium 
level, possibly through intervention by the authorities being more likely and more 
pronounced when house prices are below equilibrium than when above.  
House price bubbles are feared due to the potential consequence of a deflated bubble. At an 
individual level, home owners may find themselves in negative equity which could 
potentially lead into bankruptcy or homelessness; on a microeconomic level, a burst bubble 
may increase unemployment and loss of value to owners of capital due to the decline in 
housing related industries; and on a macroeconomic and political level, due to the well 
documented wealth effect whereby consumption increases as perceived wealth increases, a 
fall in house prices may send the overall economy into recession (Thornton, 2009). 
The housing bubble was the one of the central elements prior to the 2008 financial crisis and 
that irrational exuberance combined with a weakly regulated financial system led to rapid 
growth in mortgage lending and property purchases (Baker, 2008). The housing market began 
to decline in 2007 and then there was contagion, as confidence in the economy and property 
prices along with the financial markets vanished. But despite the initial 20% decline in house 
prices, the property bubble didnt completely burst, or as shown in Figure 1 fall as much as 
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the stock market. This is potentially because as mortgage approvals and house prices fell, the 
government and central bank intervened to support the housing market and consequently, the 
house price decline slowed down, before returning to an upward trend in 2012. 
Despite there being a considerable amount of literature with regards to the housing market 
and macroeconomic fundamentals, this paper addresses the different speeds of adjustment 
depending on whether house prices are above or below a particular threshold. In particular, 
this paper is the first to use the momentum threshold autoregressive model; M-TAR model to 
investigate the asymmetric relationship between house prices and the conventional housing 
market fundamentals, across a range of housing types. In addition it attempts to link the 
asymmetry to a political housing cycle, whereby booms in the housing market coincide with 
general elections.  
This study tests the divergence of UK house prices1 from their underlying fundamentals when 
house prices rise and the convergence to equilibrium when house prices fall using the 
asymmetric cointegration approach, which has been extensively used in studies of asset 
prices(Shen, et al., 2011), (Tsai, et al., 2012), (Posedel & Vizek, 2010). The MTAR approach 
is particularly suited to modelling intervention by the authorities in the housing market, as if 
the speed of adjustment differs depending on whether the market is above or below a 
threshold value, it implies some policy actions are causing that difference. Enders & Siklos 
(2001) explain that the type of asymmetry explained by the M-TAR model is particularly 
relevant when policy makers are more tolerant of disequilibrium in one direction than the 
other.  
1 This type of study is particularly suited to the UK market, where the majority of people own their own homes, 
giving a reasonably strong link between the housing market and macroeconomy as a whole. 
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The remainder of this paper presents a review of the economic literature on the housing 
market, describes the econometric methodology used in this project, explains the results of 
the research and concludes with policy implications. 
2. Literature review 
Due to its significance to the macroeconomy, there is an extensive range of literature on the 
relationship between housing and macroeconomic fundamentals within the linear framework. 
Results from these studies are somewhat conflicting when it comes to investigating the key 
drivers of the housing market. This could be due to the weak power of linear models, when 
there is in fact nonlinearity or threshold effects (Balke & Fomby, 1997). Studies such as 
Shnure (2005), Sutton (2002), McQuinn & OReilly (2008) and Meen (2002) confirm the 
importance of the housing market fundamentals of income and interest rates to the level of 
house prices.  
In comparison to the research carried out on linear house price models, there is relatively 
little literature that incorporates nonlinear properties into the housing market. Tsai & Chen 
(2009) investigated the asymmetric volatility of house prices using a GJR-GARCH model. 
Using house price data from 1955 to 2005, they captured the asymmetric impact of positive 
and negative shocks upon the volatility of house prices. They found that lagged innovations 
are negatively correlated with housing return. A possible explanation for this is provided by 
Shafrin & Statman (1985) who have argued that investors tend to sell investments that have 
increased in price and hold assets that have dropped in value. 
Using the M-TAR model proposed by Enders & Siklos, (2001), Tsai et al (2012) found 
asymmetric cointegration between stock prices and house prices. They discovered that when 
stock prices are growing faster than house prices, there is a strong relationship between them 
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and a quick correction to the long run equilibrium after a shock. However, they found no such 
statistically significant result when house prices outperform the stock market. These results 
support their prediction that the relationship between stock prices and house prices only 
exists when stock price performance is better than house price performance. In addition using 
a different approach, Tsai (2013) found evidence of asymmetric adjustment of house prices to 
money supply, especially downward price rigidities2. Using a LM approach, they find 
evidence of a threshold effect, as well as asymmetries in terms of negative shocks affecting 
housing volatility differently to the positive shocks. Chen et al. (2012) find similar evidence 
of asymmetry between housing and monetary policy in Taiwan. 
Posedel & Vizek (2010) investigate how house prices deviated from the housing market 
fundamentals of GDP and interest rates across four developed countries and four transition 
countries. Interestingly, they found that asymmetric price adjustment was present in the 
transition countries and the US but that the other three developed countries, including the 
UK, do not have the threshold cointegration. They predict that this is why the transition 
countries experienced a more intensive house price boom between 1998 and 2006. For the 
five countries that they did identify as having an asymmetric adjustment process, the 
adjustment is faster when the disequilibrium is below the threshold. This indicates that when 
house prices fall, there is a quicker adjustment process back to the long-run equilibrium and 
that when house prices rise, there is a slow adjustment to equilibrium. This leads to the 
conclusion that house price booms are persistent and reasonably sustainable. 
2 There is in general a lack of literature explaining and investigating whether house prices are sticky downward 
and if they are, why that is the case. Coy (2007) suggests that house prices are sticky downwards because 
sellers want a price close to recent sales values achieved within the neighbourhood during boom-times. 
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Due to data constraints in some of the transition countries, Posedel & Vizek investigated the 
UK housing market over a relatively short time period and since cointegration is a long-run 
phenomena and asymmetric cointegration looks at the adjustment process from booms and 
busts, the results from this period are not that reliable. In an attempt to address this issue 
Posedel & Vizek also investigated UK annual data from 1969-2008. Although this data set 
involves periods of house price growth and declines, the results are only based on 40 
observations.  
 Although there is very few studies that analyse the political business cycle with respect to the 
housing market, Rogoff (1990) suggests that politicians can use expenditure on high profile 
projects to signal their competence to the electorate, the housing market could be included 
among such projects. Veiga and Veiga (2007) use local government data for Portugal and 
show that investment in the more high profile projects, such as miscellaneous construction 
increases prior to elections, although there is no evidence that investment in land and housing 
does, possibly because of the long time lag before this becomes evident to the electorate. 
3. Methodology
This paper predicts that there is a significant difference between the adjustments to long-run 
equilibrium in the housing market depending on whether there is a positive or negative shock. 
This is because policy makers are more likely to intervene in the market if house prices fall, 
due to the potential problems to the wider economy. Cointegration exists where a 
combination of non-stationary variables follows a stationary path. When there is asymmetry 
in the adjustment to long-run equilibrium, symmetric cointegration is misspecified (Balke & 
Fomby, 1997). Therefore, to investigate the predicted asymmetric relationship between house 
prices and housing market fundamentals, the TAR and M-TAR models as proposed by 
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Enders & Granger (1998) and Enders & Siklos (2001) are employed. Enders & Granger 
(1998) and Enders & Siklos (2001) have developed the threshold autoregressive (TAR) and 
momentum-TAR (M-TAR) models to test for cointegration where there is asymmetry in the 
adjustments to equilibrium.  
The models test the asymmetric adjustment to the long-run equilibrium: 
D   	 
1   	  (1)
Where  is the Heaviside indicator function such that  
  1 if   
  0 if   
 is the residuals from the regression of house prices against a constant and the explanatory 
variables,  is the threshold,  is a random vector with zero mean and constant variance and  are the speed of adjustment coefficients. 
If  is above or below its long run equilibrium, the adjustment is or 
respectively. For example, if     1, the positive phase of  will tend to be more 
persistent than the negative phase assuming equal magnitudes of positive and negative 
shocks. The special case of the TAR cointegration model where   is the case of linear 
cointegration. If the null hypothesis of    is rejected however, the adjustment is 
asymmetric. 
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In the M-TAR model, Enders & Siklos (2001) suggest an alternative model whereby the rate 
of decay depends on the changes in the regression residuals. In this case, the Heaviside 
indicators threshold depends on the change in the lagged variable: 
  1 if D  
  0 if D  
The M-TAR model captures a different type of asymmetry to the TAR model. In the M-TAR 
model, if for example     1, positive shocks tend to persist and negative shocks 
revert quickly to equilibrium irrespective of the magnitude of disequilibrium. Enders & 
Siklos (2001) explain that the test for whether asymmetric cointegration exists, consists of 
firstly testing whether there is a long run relationship between the variables using the  
statistic to test the null hypothesis     0 followed by testing for asymmetric 
adjustments from disequilibrium using the F statistic to test the null hypothesis   . 
Critical values for the test of the long run relationship for a multivariate relationship are 
provided by Wane et al (2004). In terms of the difference between TAR and MTAR models 
with regard to interpretation, Sichel (1993) defines two types of asymmetry: 
1. Deepness  the magnitude of the distance from equilibrium differs between positive or 
negative shocks i.e. house prices differ more from the long run equilibrium after a 
positive/negative shock. This asymmetry type is captured by the TAR model. 
2. Steepness  the adjustment speeds of economic variables differs between positive or 
negative shocks i.e. house prices react quicker in response to a positive/negative shock 
from the long run equilibrium. This asymmetry type is captured by the M-TAR model. 
If there is asymmetric cointegration found in the TAR model, it will be concluded that there 
is a long run relationship and that the size of the disequilibrium following positive or negative 
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shocks to house prices differ. If there is asymmetric cointegration found in the M-TAR 
model, it will be concluded that there is a long run relationship and that the rate of adjustment 
from disequilibrium is quicker in response to a positive or negative shock. If there is no 
cointegration in any of the models, it will be concluded that there is no long run relationship 
between house prices and the housing market fundamentals specified. 
In conventional economic analysis of house prices and as supported by research from 
McQuinn & OReilly (2008), Reichert (1990) among others, the key housing market 
fundamentals are personal income and the interest rates on mortgages. The baseline model3
estimated looks at the relationship between house prices and these standard explanatory 
variables.  
tttt iyhp   210       (2) 
 Where  is log real house prices,  is log real personal income,  is the mortgage rate, 
is a constant and  is the error term. It is expected that when personal income is greater, 
individuals are willing and able to spend more on housing and hence a positive relationship 
between house prices and personal income is expected. A negative relationship between 
interest rates and house prices are expected as investments in houses become less attractive 
and affordable when mortgage payments increase.  
After asymmetric cointegration has been established, the short-run responses to positive and 
negative shocks can be investigated through an error correction model (ECM) as explained 
by Enders & Granger (1998). To test for the existence of a political housing cycle, we have 
added a dummy variable, which takes the value of one in the quarter when an election occurs 
3 Although many other studies have added alternative factors in addition to the ones included here, such as 
inflation, the low levels of inflation over the time span included here would make this less relevant. 
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and zero otherwise. We would expect this to be positive and significant if a political business 
cycle exists, as this would suggest that house prices were above average before and during an 
election. The ECM is then: 
D   	 
D 	 	
D 	 
D 	 	  	  	 
(3) 
Where    if   ; otherwise   0.    if   ; otherwise   0. (L) is a lag operator.  and  represent the speed of adjustment to long-run 
equilibrium following positive or negative shocks respectively. Dummy is the general 
election dummy variable4. 
This paper aims to investigate the following hypotheses: The adjustments from 
disequilibrium are asymmetric where there is a greater speed of adjustment to equilibrium 
following negative shocks than positive shocks. Following a positive shock, house prices rise 
faster than their explanatory variables, they inflate explosively in a bubble. Anticipating 
further house price rises, buyers believe that it is a profitable investment and lenders believe 
that there is less risk in mortgage lending. Transactions and demand then grow at an 
increasing pace due to herd behaviour and hence a bubble is formed. When this is the case, 
there is a slow adjustment back to the long run equilibrium. 
When there is a negative shock to the housing market, such as following a banking crisis, 
transactions fall because sellers are averse to losses and mortgage approvals decline as a 
result of increased perceived risk in the property market. This produces a potential for a 
4 Other windows for the dummy variable were also tried, but they didnt improve the results. 
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decline in house prices. In addition, the reaction of the policymaker following a positive or 
negative shock is likely to be different, as it is in the interests of policymakers to have 
increasing house prices thus they are more likely to intervene in a declining market than a 
booming one. This results in a much quicker adjustment to long-run equilibrium when 
property prices are below equilibrium. Monetary and fiscal policy measures, such as 
quantitative easing or help to buy schemes are frequently used to boost house prices when 
growth is below average but that contractionary policy when house prices are above 
equilibrium is very rare. There are many reasons for why this might be the case. 
Ansell (2009) found that rising house prices leads to cabinet stability and hence politicians 
have an incentive to act when house prices fall but not intervene when house prices rise. Over 
60% of the UK population are homeowners so it is in the policymakers interest to please this 
majority by helping to inflate house prices (O'Brien, 2013). Popa (2013) found that the larger 
the proportion of homeowners in a country, the more artificial house price appreciation will 
emerge from the political process. Popas research suggests that with a large proportion of 
homeowners, policy makers will subsidise home buying through relaxed credit conditions in 
order to satisfy the demands of the majority of voters. 
Falling house prices are likely to have a negative wealth effect and any resultant decrease in 
consumption is likely to deepen into an economic slump. In addition, Richards (2013) argues 
that intervention to boost the housing market is a popular policy and hence comes at 
"convenient times in the electoral cycle. This also follows analysis of Rogoff (1990) who 
suggests before elections more visible investment is likely to be encouraged. Richards (2013) 
also suggests that the banks benefit most from house price rises. Since the banking market is 
so significant to the prosperity of the UK economy, the government may have no choice but 
to only implement measures that increase the rate of house price appreciation. 
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 We also assess whether the presence of asymmetric cointegration varies across different 
types of housing, with the cheaper end of the market more likely to provide evidence of 
asymmetry. As many of the policies introduced over the years to encourage the housing 
market have been aimed at first-time buyers, we would expect the asymmetry to be more 
evident in the types of houses they are most likely to buy, which would be the flats and 
terraced properties. Examples of this type of policy include, the help-to-buy scheme 
introduced in 2013 as a result of the financial crisis and fall in the supply of mortgages from 
the banks. In addition there have been many examples of fiscal changes to encourage the 
cheaper end of the housing market, such as raising the threshold at which stamp duty is paid, 
which for instance during the fall in house prices in the early 1990s was raised from £30,000 
to £60,000.  Although this type of policy can help all property types, we would expect it to 
affect smaller properties relative to the larger ones. 
4. Data and Results 
This study uses quarterly data from 1980:Q1 to 2013:Q2 (134 observations) for the combined 
housing type index and 1991:Q1 to 2013: Q2 for the individual housing type indexes, as the 
latter data only begins in 1991. The Nationwide seasonally adjusted quarterly index of all 
properties is employed for house prices, as well as the indexes for flats, terraced houses, 
semi-detached houses and detached housing. This index provides data that refers to the 
typical house in the market and, according to Ward (2012), it provides trends that are more 
consistent with other indices than the alternative long running data set by Halifax. 
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) seasonally adjusted quarterly disposable income 
data (determined from the sum of household final consumption expenditure and savings less 
the change in net equity of households in pension funds) is obtained as a measure for personal 
income. Oxford Economics building society mortgages quarterly interest rate data provides a 
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long period data set of the effective interest rate in relation to the UK housing market. As data 
is only available from 1980, this limits the period of time that is analysed. 
Enders & Siklos (2001) explain that the linear cointegration strategy can be biased towards 
the conclusion of no cointegration when the relationship is asymmetric. Therefore, both 
forms of asymmetric cointegration, TAR and M-TAR are investigated to determine whether 
there is any long-run relationship present between house prices, mortgage rates and personal 
income. Table 1 reports the tests for a unit root, suggesting all the variables are I(1). 
Table 2 reports the results from the TAR asymmetric cointegration test5. Asymmetric 
cointegration is tested firstly through the TAR model, which investigates whether the 
deepness of positive or negative shocks are greater. As can be seen in table 2, the results 
suggest that there is not a statistically significant long run relationship that can be explained 
after considering the existence of different magnitudes of disequilibrium from positive or 
negative shocks. Although this finding suggests that this type of asymmetry doesnt exist, the 
M-TAR model tests for an alternative form of asymmetry in the relationship. To investigate 
whether economic agents react differently when the housing market underperforms its 
fundamentals to when it outperforms them. 
Table 3 reports the results from the M-TAR asymmetric cointegration, the M-TAR model 
investigates steepness asymmetry; i.e. it tests for whether there is a quicker speed of 
response for positive or negative shocks. Unlike the TAR model, when the threshold level is 
determined efficiently by the data, the  statistic is significant at the 10% significance level 
5 Results from the Ljung-Box test for serial correlation, suggests that the residuals are white noise and hence 
there is no issue of serial correlation in these tests.
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allowing the null hypothesis of no cointegration to be rejected. In addition, the F-Statistic is 
significant at the 1% level allowing the null hypothesis of symmetric cointegration to be 
rejected. 
The results suggest that the M-TAR test with the data-determined threshold was most 
successful in detecting cointegration. This could be as a result of the greater power of the M-
TAR model (Enders & Siklos, 2001) and/or because there is asymmetry in the speed of 
response from positive and negative shocks rather than asymmetry in the magnitude of the 
disequilibrium from positive and negative shocks. This is certainly the case with house price 
booms and busts. Policy makers aim to avoid house price falls at all costs but are not worried 
by disequilibrium caused by house price bubbles. In addition, this type of asymmetry could 
suggest that policy makers are reactive rather than proactive in response to negative shocks 
to the housing market; i.e. the policy maker implements policy in response to shocks to help 
return the housing market to equilibrium but does not reduce the magnitudes of these shocks 
when they are about to occur. 
In this M-TAR model, the sign of  is negative, which explains that when there is a negative 
shock, there is convergence to the long-run equilibrium. This result is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This fast adjustment from disequilibrium following a negative shock to the 
housing market supports our hypothesis of intervention supporting the housing market after a 
negative shock. As previously discussed, numerous factors explain this sticky price 
phenomenon, preventing the market from further decline. Policymakers know the substantial 
negative effects of falling prices on the economy, and their popularity, and so react to the 
decline with expansionary policy. 
On the other hand, the point estimate of  for positive shocks to the housing market, show , is positive. This suggests that after a positive shock, the housing market diverges from its 
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equilibrium relationship with housing market fundamentals. When house prices rise, 
individuals and banks believe house prices will continue to rise. This makes investing in 
property less risky and, as a result, banks are more willing to lend and individuals are eager to 
buy as soon as possible to make the most of the rising market. This results in an increase in 
demand hence house prices inflate at an even faster rate. Despite disequilibrium in the 
market, policymakers see no need to respond as rising house prices boost spending through 
the wealth effect and also increases their probability of re-election since the majority of 
voters in the UK are homeowners. This divergence discussed above is not statistically 
significant. However, what is clear from this M-TAR model is that there is little or no 
convergence for positive D but substantial decay for negative D. This means that 
increases tend to persist but decreases tend to revert quickly to equilibrium. 
It is important to note that the efficient threshold determined by the data that is used to draw 
the above conclusions is slightly negative. This suggests that for small negative changes in 
the error term, i.e. small negative shocks to the housing market, there is little or no 
adjustment back to equilibrium. This could be because economic agents do not react to small 
negative shocks as they do not see it as a significant change in the market. 
  The results for the individual housing types follow a similar pattern to the combined housing 
index, in that there is no evidence of asymmetric cointegration based on the TAR model, but 
strong evidence when using the MTAR model. Again the positive error terms tend to be 
insignificant, whilst the negative errors are correctly signed and also highly significant, 
implying a quick return to equilibrium. The speed of adjustment for the negative shocks 
seems to be quickest for the terraced and semi-detached houses, rather than the flats, possibly 
indicating that policy makers are most concerned with this group of houses as it is where the 
floating voters are most likely to live.  
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The existence of asymmetric cointegration justifies the investigation of the error correction 
model in order to estimate the short-run dynamics of the relationship. The estimation results 
are shown in Table 4. As can be seen, the error correction terms for both positive and 
negative shocks are statistically insignificant. This result of asymmetric cointegration but 
statistically insignificant error correction terms in the error correction model is consistent 
with the findings of Enders & Siklos (2001). This suggests that even though there is long-run 
asymmetric cointegration, there is no reaction to disequilibrium in the short-run. This could 
be because economic agents only respond to prolonged periods of disequilibrium or because 
of the significant lag time between actual house price performance and the resultant effects of 
the reaction of economic agents to the market news. For example, Case et al (2013) identified 
recognition, implementation and response lags for monetary and fiscal policy and, according 
to the Bank of England (2014), the response lag alone for monetary policy is 2 years.  
 The ECMs for the individual housing types produce more mixed results suggesting different 
dynamics across the different housing types, reflecting potential differences in the wealth of 
those buying the houses. Although the positive error correction terms are all insignificant, 
again suggesting little adjustment when above equilibrium, for flats and detached houses the 
error correction is significant when below equilibrium, with flats as expected having the 
quickest speed of adjustment. However for the medium range houses, there is little evidence 
of significant adjustment, possibly because the intervention policies are aimed at them to a 
lesser extent. The dummy variables measuring the political housing cycle are not significant 
for the combined housing index and the flats and terraced housing also produces insignificant 
dummy variables. However both semi-detached and detached housing produce significant 
variables indicating these houses tend to follow a political housing cycle to some extent. 
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5. Conclusion 
This study finds evidence of asymmetry in the long-run relationship between UK house 
prices and the macroeconomic fundamentals, due to the differing reactions of policy makers, 
homeowners and lenders to positive and negative economic shocks to the housing market. 
Policy makers intervene in a weak housing market but are less inclined to introduce 
appropriate policies when house prices are booming due to the importance of the housing 
market to the economy and possibly voting. Also in a rising market, where there is no 
incentive for the authorities to intervene, potential house price bubbles can occur through 
inaction by the authorities as well as herd behaviour  
The results of the initial M-TAR model reveal that there is a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between house prices and the property market fundamentals of mortgage rates 
and personal income and that there is asymmetric adjustment from disequilibrium. In 
addition, the findings reveal convergence to equilibrium following negative shocks to house 
prices but divergence from equilibrium following positive shocks. This result is the case 
regardless of the type of housing. 
Results from the asymmetric error correction models suggest little evidence of asymmetric 
adjustment to positive and negative shocks in the short-run. However the ECMs of the 
different types of housing do produce differing results, with both flats and detached houses 
having significantly negative error correction terms when below equilibrium, with as 
expected flats being the most significant and suggesting the quickest adjustment back to 
equilibrium from below. There is little evidence of a political housing cycle as the dummy 
variables are mostly insignificant. This could suggest that the impetus for moving housing 
back to its equilibrium following a negative shock comes from the monetary authorities 
rather than being politically motivated. 
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  With regard to the policy implications of these findings, the results suggest that policies 
aimed to boost the housing market, for example the current Help to Buy scheme in the UK, 
may have the desired effect of boosting house prices over a prolonged time period. However 
the rises will need to be closely monitored to prevent an unstable bubble forming in the 
housing market and a contingency policy will need to be prepared to ensure the rises arent 
excessive and cause long-term damage to the economy. To an extent this may already be 
happening as the financial sector sets more rigorous criteria for granting mortgages, 
following advice from the central bank. But in the future the authorities may need to be more 
prepared to intervene in the housing market when it is above equilibrium, as well as when 
below. Future research could analyse this asymmetric effect in housing across the regions in 
the UK as well as countries where the housing market is not as significant, such as Germany, 
although data is still fairly limited in this case.
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Table 1  Unit root test results
ADF Test Test for I(0) Test for I(1) 
T-statistic Critical Value (5%) T-statistic Critical Value (5%) 
Log real house 
prices 
Without trend -1.1373 -2.8834 -4.6422 -2.8834 
With trend -1.8372 -3.4440 -4.7173 -3.4442 
Log real stock 
prices 
Without trend -2.0440 -2.8832 -11.9043 -2.8834 
With trend -2.1373 -3.4440 -11.9958 -3.4442 
Log real personal 
income 
Without trend -1.0011 -2.8832 -11.2599 -2.8834 
With trend -2.7208 -3.4440 -11.3454 -3.4442 
Mortgage rates 
Without trend -1.2701 -2.8832 -9.8939 -2.8834 
With trend -2.5539 -3.4440 -9.8644 -3.4442 
Null hypothesis: There is a unit root 
Lag length determined by the Schwarz Info Criterion 
KPSS Test Test for I(0) Test for I(1) 
T-statistic Critical Value (5%) T-statistic Critical Value (5%) 
Log real house 
prices 
Without trend 1.1335 0.4630 0.1183 0.4630 
With trend 0.1550 0.1460 0.1145 0.1460 
Log real stock 
prices 
Without trend 1.1462 0.4630 0.1877 0.4630 
With trend 0.2695 0.1460 0.0344 0.1460 
Log real personal 
income 
Without trend 0.8633 0.4630 0.3070 0.4630 
With trend 0.2854 0.1460 0.1033 0.1460 
Mortgage rates 
Without trend 1.3290 0.4630 0.0389 0.4630 
With trend 0.2770 0.1460 0.0326 0.1460 
Null hypothesis: The variable is stationary 
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Table 2  TAR asymmetric cointegration test results  
 All Flats Terraced Semi-
Detached 
Detached 
 (threshold 
value)
0.2810 0.2710 0.203 0.203 -0.062 
1
2
021  
(f statistic) 
21  
(F statistic) 
-0.085 
(0.034) 
-0.030 
(0.038) 
3.386 
1.152 
-0.116 
(0.057) 
-0.050 
(0.064) 
2.280 
0.600 
-0.108 
(0.050) 
-0.030 
(0.070) 
2.357 
0.834 
-0.107 
(0.050) 
-0.0322 
(0.072) 
2.378 
0.757 
-0.099 
(0.048) 
-0.030 
(0.073) 
2.177 
0.627 
Notes: Numbers in the brackets are standard errors.  
***, **, * represent statistical signiicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% signiicance levels respectively. 
Critical values o f statistic obtained rom (Wane, et al., 2004). 
Table 3MTAR asymmetric cointegration test results  
 All Flats Terraced Semi-
Detached 
Detached 
 (threshold 
value)
-0.007 -0.015 -0.028 -0.019 -0.007 
1
2
021  
(f statistic) 
21  
(F statistic) 
0.006 
(0.032) 
-0.162 
(0.039) 
8.625 
11.189 
0.036 
(0.043) 
-0.417 
(0.070) 
17.870 
30.369 
0.023 
(0.032) 
-0.680 
(0.075) 
42.214 
77.022 
0.035 
(0.035) 
-0.572 
(0.070) 
34.550 
62.167 
0.037 
(0.040) 
-0.408 
(0.066) 
19.403 
33.610 
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Table 4  Error correction model statistics based on the MTAR model  
Variable All Flats Terraced Semi-
Detached 
Detached 
constant 

1t

1t
1 thp
1 ty
1 ti
Dummy 
Adjusted R2 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.023 
(0.021) 
0.789 
(0.064) 
0.017 
(0.038) 
-0.008 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
0.566 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.026 
(0.023) 
-0.104 
(0.037) 
0.460 
(0.106) 
0.045 
(0.607) 
-0.027 
(2.316) 
0.012 
(0.016) 
0.195 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.041 
(0.027) 
0.754 
(0.082) 
0.068 
(0.043) 
-0.017 
(0.006) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.510 
-0.003 
(1.074) 
0.710 
(0.384) 
-0.022 
(0.013) 
0.735 
(0.083) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.016 
(0.006) 
0.023 
(0.009) 
0.497 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
-0.048 
(0.024) 
0.653 
(0.093) 
0.026 
(0.042) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.019 
(0.009) 
0.389 
Notes: The table reports the estimation results or the ollowing asymmetric error correction model: D    	
D
  	D
  	D
  

  
  
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Figure 1. The UK house prices relative to UK stock prices 
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